Quote
Joan
За мен основните изводи от дикусията с вас са два: 1) няма данни за прираста на белите в увеличения прираст в развитите страни (което си го знаех, но все пак исках да видя и друго мнение), от което за мен лично следва изводът, че тази раждаемост най-вероятно не е на белите, а е инерция от раждаемостта на имиграните, инерция в смисъл че и тяхната раждаемост пада в сравнение с родината им, когато се интегрират. Но все пак раждат по 2-3-4 деца, когато белите много по-често остават с 1.
Първоначално аз се опитах да отговоря на друга Ваша забележка – че с увеличаване богатството на населението и подобряване икономическото положение на една страна раждаемостта пада. Тъй като статията, линк към която Ви изпратих не е свободно достъпна и Вие нямате достъп до нея –ето няколко пасажа от статията за да добиете представа:
The critical HDI level at which the development–fertility association
reverses from negative to positive is estimated as 0.86
(Supplementary Information). Our preferred estimates then suggest
that the effect of HDI increases on fertility levels is equal to 21.59
(P,0.05) for HDI levels below 0.86. The effect of HDI increases on
fertility levels is estimated to be 4.07 (P,0.001) for HDI levels at or
above 0.86 (model 1 in Fig. 3). That is, on average an HDI increase of
0.1 results in a reduction of the TFR by 0.159 as long as countries are
at development levels with HDI below 0.86; in contrast, an HDI
increase of 0.05 results in an increase of the TFR by 0.204
(50.0534.07) once countries attain an advanced development
stage with HDI$0.86. This fertility increase of approximately 0.2
children per woman for a 0.05 increase in HDI is sizable, and it
corresponds closely to the graphical analyses presented in Fig. 2:
for all countries ending in the top-right quadrant of Fig. 1, for
example, TFR increased on average by 0.16 per 0.05 increase in
HDI after the reference year.
The earlier finding of a positive HDI–fertility relationship at
advanced HDI levels is robust even when the total fertility rate is
adjusted for ‘tempo effects’7—that is, the distortions that occur in
the TFR as a result of the postponement of childbearing to later
maternal ages14. In particular, the estimated effect of increases in
HDI on the fertility level at advanced stages of development
(HDI$0.86) remains positive and significant even if the tempoadjusted
TFR15 is used as the dependent variable instead of the conventional
TFR, or if the regression analyses include a further control
for changes in the mean age at childbearing. Our findings are also
robust with respect to alternative specifications of the statistical
model that include a lagged HDI, and they are also not influenced
by single data points or countries (models 2–4 in Fig. 3 and
Supplementary Information).
The existence of a positive HDI–fertility relationship at advanced
development stages indicates that further development has the
potential to reverse earlier fertility declines once countries reach very
high HDI levels. This finding has important implications in at least
two domains. First, given the heterogeneity of institutional, cultural
and policy contexts across developed countries, further research is
required to investigate the different mechanisms that may underlie
this reversal—particularly in light of exceptions such as Japan,
Canada and South Korea. Specifically, an improved understanding
of how improved labour-market flexibility, social security and individual
welfare, gender and economic equality, human capital and
social/family policies can facilitate relatively high levels of fertility
in advanced societies is needed8,16–18. For instance, analyses on
Europe show that nowadays a positive relationship is observed
between fertility and indicators of innovation in family behaviour
or female labour-force participation19. Also, at advanced levels of
development, governments might explicitly address fertility decline
by implementing policies that improve gender equality or the compatibility
between economic success, including labour force participation,
and family life10,17,18. Failure to answer to the challenges
of development with institutions that facilitate work–family balance
and gender equality might explain the exceptional pattern for rich
eastern Asian countries that continue to be characterized by a negative
HDI–fertility relationship20.
Second, our findings are highly relevant in the debate on the future
of the world’s population. Whereas a decade ago Europe, North
America and Japan were assumed to face very rapid population ageing
and in many cases significant population declines6,7,21, our findings
provide a different outlook for the twenty-first century. As long
as the most developed countries focus on increasing the well-being of
their citizens, and adequate institutions are in place, the analyses in
this paper suggest that increases in development are likely to reverse
fertility declines—even if we cannot expect fertility to rise again
above replacement levels. As a consequence, we expect countries at
the most advanced development stages to face a relatively stable
population size, if not an increase in total population in cases in
which immigration is substantial. For countries in which immigration
is a minor component of demographic change, our analyses
suggest a slower population decline than is at present foreseen in
official demographic forecasts. Although significant population ageing
is still certain in countries at the highest development levels, its
magnitude may have been exaggerated by the widely held current
perception that, as social and economic development progresses,
fertility is bound to fall further. Policies targeted at further increasing
HDI levels in advanced societies may therefore be suitable as a general
strategy to reduce demographic imbalances caused by very low fertility
levels. Consistent with current scientific knowledge, our findings
also support the view that progress in development contributes
to lower fertility levels in countries with low to moderately high HDI
levels. Moreover, countries remaining at intermediate development
levels are likely to face a decline in population size because these
countries have attained low TFR levels and they do not yet—and
may not in the foreseeable future—benefit from the reversal of the
development–fertility relationship.
1. Bryant, J. Theories of fertility decline and the evidence from development
indicators. Popul. Dev. Rev. 33, 101–127 (2007).
2. Lee, R. D. The demographic transition: three centuries of fundamental change. J.
Econ. Perspect. 17, 167–190 (2003).
3. Bongaarts, J. & Watkins, S. C. Social interactions and contemporary fertility
transitions. Popul. Dev. Rev. 22, 639–682 (1996).
4. Wilson, C. Fertility below replacement level. Science 304, 207–209 (2004).
5. Lutz, W., Sanderson, W. & Scherbov, S. The coming acceleration of global
population aging. Nature 451, 716–719 (2008).
6. Lutz, W., O’Neill, B. C. & Scherbov, S. Europe’s population at a turning point.
Science 299, 1991–1992 (2003).
7. Bongaarts, J. Demographic consequences of declining fertility. Science 282,
419–420 (1998).
8. Kohler, H.-P., Billari, F. C. & Ortega, J. A. The emergence of lowest-low fertility in
Europe during the 1990s. Popul. Dev. Rev. 28, 641–681 (2002).
9. Butler, D. The fertility riddle. Nature 432, 38–39 (2004).
10. Balter, M. The baby deficit. Science 312, 1894–1897 (2006).
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hdr.undp.org]
statistics/æ (29 September 2008).
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Populations? (United Nations, 2000).
13. Wooldridge, J. M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Ch. 10 (MIT
Press, 2002).
14. Sobotka, T. Is lowest-low fertility in Europe explained by the postponement of
childbearing? Popul. Dev. Rev. 30, 195–220 (2004).
15. Bongaarts, J. & Feeney, G. On the quantum and tempo of fertility. Popul. Dev. Rev.
24, 271–291 (1998).
16. Brewster, K. L. & Rindfuss, R. R. Fertility and women’s employment in
industrialized nations. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 26, 271–296 (2000).
17. McDonald, P. Gender equity in theories of fertility transition. Popul. Dev. Rev. 26,
427–440 (2000).
18. Neyer, G. & Andersson, G. Consequences of family policies on childbearing
behavior: effects or artifacts? Popul. Dev. Rev. 34, 699–724 (2008).
19. Billari, F. C.&Kohler, H.-P. Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe. Popul.
Stud. 58, 161–176 (2004).
20. Suzuki, T. Lowest-low fertility in Korea and Japan. J. Popul. Probl. 59, 1–16 (2003).
21. Lutz, W., Sanderson, W. & Scherbov, S. The end of world population growth.
Nature 412, 543–545 (2001).
Съгласен съм, че мигрантите имат значим принос към нарастването на раждаемостта в развитите страни, но то не обяснява напълно наблюдавания ефект. В Европа има "бели" страни със сравнително малко имигранти (например Финландия), които имат значителна раждаемост поради социалната политика, която провеждат.
Редактиран 2 път(и).Последна редакция на 2011-02-10 12:58 от demograph.
. Сбитото споменаване на толкова много години вероятно трябва да му придаде голяма доза наукообразност. Има толкова много фактори, които не са взети под внимание, че не си заслужава подробна критика.
